Debtor-Tenants Located in Shopping Centers Must Satisfy Heightened Requirements When Assuming and Assigning Their Unexpired Lease in Bankruptcy by Catalano, Kristin
St. John's University School of Law 
St. John's Law Scholarship Repository 
Bankruptcy Research Library Center for Bankruptcy Studies 
2019 
Debtor-Tenants Located in Shopping Centers Must Satisfy 
Heightened Requirements When Assuming and Assigning Their 
Unexpired Lease in Bankruptcy 
Kristin Catalano 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/bankruptcy_research_library 
 Part of the Bankruptcy Law Commons 
This Research Memorandum is brought to you for free and open access by the Center for Bankruptcy Studies at St. 
John's Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Bankruptcy Research Library by an 
authorized administrator of St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
selbyc@stjohns.edu. 

American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review | St. John’s School of Law, 8000 Utopia Parkway, Queens, NY 11439  
 
thereof, including (but not limited to) provisions such as a radius, location, use, or 
exclusivity provision, and will not breach any such provision contained in any 
other lease, financing agreement, or master agreement relating to such shopping 
center; and (D) that assumption or assignment of such lease will not disrupt any 
tenant mix or balance in such shopping center.3 
 
Assignment is impermissible if any of the subsections of 365(b)(3) are not met.4  
This memorandum will examine section 365(b)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code and its 
implications. Part I will briefly examine the term “adequate assurance.” Part II will focus on the 
requirement of adequate financial condition and rent stabilization under section 365(b)(3)(A), 
(B). Part III will evaluate the requirement of compliance with lease provisions and agreements 
within shopping centers and the overt tension between section 365(b)(3)(C) and section 
365(f)(1). Part IV will assess the requirement of avoiding disruption of the tenant mix and 
balance in the shopping center in section 365(b)(3)(D). 
DISCUSSION 
I.  Assessing Adequate Assurance 
  The cornerstone of section 365(b) of the Bankruptcy Code is “adequate assurance.” 
Congress adopted the term “adequate assurance” from section 2-609 of the Uniform Commercial 
Code.5 An official comment to section 2-609 of the Uniform Commercial Code attempts to 
provide some guidance on the interpretation of adequate assurance, stating that “‘adequate’ 
assurance is to be ‘defined by commercial rather than legal standards.’”6 Further, “[w]hat 
constitutes “adequate assurance” is to be determined by factual conditions; the seller must 
 
3 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(3). 
4 See In re Heilig-Meyers Co., 294 B.R. 660, 662 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2001). 
5 See Jason B. Binford, Beyond Chimerical Possibilities: The Meaning and Application of Adequate Assurance of 
Future Performance Under the Bankruptcy Code, 18 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 191, 192 (2010). 
6 U.C.C. § 2-609 cmt. 3. 
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exercise good faith and observe commercial standards; his satisfaction must be based upon 
reason and must not be arbitrary or capricious.”7  
 Although the meaning of adequate assurance is vague, there is a general consensus 
among the courts that adequate assurance is intended to allow “practical, pragmatic 
construction,” which is to be “determined by consideration of the facts of the proposed 
assumption.”8 Thus, satisfaction of adequate assurance of future performance can range from a 
simple promise to pay to guaranteed performance.9  
Section 365(b)(3) provides special protections for shopping centers through the specific 
provisions concerning adequate assurance. Section 365(b)(3) requires adequate assurance of 
future performance for unexpired shopping center leases and requires the non-debtor party be 
provided with the full benefit of the bargain, eliminating any potential leeway in changing that 
bargain.10 Adequate assurance is directed at protecting the financial well-being of landlords.11 
The legislative intent rests on the prospect of protecting the economic expectations of shopping 
center landlords from the potentially tragic ripple effect of the debtor’s bankruptcy.12  
II.  The Requirement to Maintain Financial Stability  
The general requirement of providing adequate assurance of future performance in 
assuming and assigning an unexpired lease or contract under section 365(b) omits specific 
language as to what sufficiently satisfies the provision. This is distinguishable from section 
365(b)(3), which delineates specific requirements a debtor must satisfy in providing adequate 
 
7 Richmond Leasing Co. v. Capital Bank, N.A., 762 F.2d 1303, 1310 (5th Cir. 1985). 
8 In re Sapolin Paints, Inc., 5 B.R. 412, 420 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1980). 
9 See Binford, supra note, at 5. 
10 See In re Ames Dept. Stores, Inc., 127 B.R. 744, 754 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
11 See Matter of U. L. Radio Corp., 19 B.R. 537, 541 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982). 
12 See Pamela S. Holleman & Magdalena Ellis, Reexamining the Protections Afforded to Solvent Shopping Center 
Tenants Under §365 in Light of In Re Track Auto Corp. Part II, 24 AM. BANKR. INST. J., Feb. 2005 at 53. 
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assurance for assignments in shopping centers.13 Section 365(b)(3)(A) requires adequate 
assurance of the source of rent and other consideration under such lease and if the lease is 
assigned, the assignee must have a financial condition and operating performance similar to the 
original tenant when the lease was executed.14 In addition, section 365(b)(3)(B) requires 
adequate assurance that the percentage of rent under a lease will not substantially decline.15 The 
legislative history indicates that the purpose of this specific language was “to ensure that the 
assignee itself will not soon go into bankruptcy and will provide operating and advertising 
benefits to the other tenants similar to those provided by the original tenant when its lease was 
executed.”16  
It is widely accepted that the burden of proving such adequate assurance of future 
performance is on the debtor. However, debtors need not prove a profit will be made by 
assignment or provide an absolute guarantee of performance.17 “Section 365(b)(3)(A) requires 
that ‘the financial condition and operating performance’ of [the assignee] ‘be similar’ to that of 
the Debtors at the time the lease was executed.18 The statute's main purpose is to provide 
adequate assurance for the payment of future rent, “[the court] interpret[s] this to mean that the 
financial condition and operating performance of [the assignee] must be at least as strong as was 
the Debtors'.”19  
 Moreover, in regard to section 365(b)(3)(B), Congress does not require all leases to have 
percentage rent clauses.20 “It must simply appear that the rent will be paid and other lease 
 
13 See 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(3). 
14 Id. § 365(b)(3)(A). 
15 Id. § 365(b)(3)(B). 
16 In re Casual Male Corp., 120 B.R. 256 n.8 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1990) (citing 130 CONG. REC. S. 889 reprinted 
in App. 3 Collier on Bankruptcy XX–71 (15th ed. 1989)).   
17 See In re M. Fine Lumber Co., 383 B.R. 565, 573 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2008). 
18 In re Casual Male Corp., 120 B.R. at 264. 
19 Id.  
20 See In re Sun TV and Appliances, Inc., 234 B.R. 356, 368 (Bankr. D. Del. 1999). 
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obligations will be met.”21 Accordingly, courts will consider things such as “the debtor’s 
payment history, presence of guarantee, presence of a security deposit, evidence of profitability, 
a plan that would earmark money exclusively for the landlord, the general outlook on the 
debtor’s industry, and whether the unexpired lease is at, or below, the prevailing rate.”22  
The Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of New York evaluated the heightened 
requirements in providing adequate assurance of future performance for shopping centers in In re 
Sapolin Paints.23 There, the debtor, Sapolin, filed a liquidating plan under chapter 11 of the 
Bankruptcy Code.24 Three years before voluntarily filing for bankruptcy, Sapolin acquired a 
California leasehold.25 The lease payments under that lease were significantly below the market 
rate at the time the petition was filed.26 Thereafter, Sapolin asked bankruptcy court approval to 
assign the lease to Metropolitan Greetings (“Metropolitan”).27 Metropolitan provided the court 
with satisfactory financial information, but the landlord argued that Metropolitan could not 
satisfy the provision in the lease requiring the tenant to ensure the property would not be vacant 
or abandoned.28 However, the court stated that the landlord “should not be permitted to work the 
forfeiture of a valuable asset of the debtor on the basis of chimerical possibilities.”29 The court 
emphasized the fact that the under-market lease was very valuable and held that the “economic 
 
21 In re M. Fine Lumber Co., 383 B.R. at 573. 
22 Id.; see, e.g., In re Prime Motor Inns, Inc., 166 B.R. 993, 995 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1994) (finding adequate assurance 
based on substantial capital investments); cf. In re OK KWI Lynn Candles, Inc., 75 B.R. 97, 101–02 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ohio 1987) (refusing to allow assumption of shopping center lease because debtor provided no evidence of source of 
payment of rent, aside from “continued operation of its business”). 
23 In re Sapolin Paints, Inc., 5 B.R. at 414. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. at 421.  
27 Id. at 415.  
28 Id. at 418.  
29 Id. at 421.  
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condition . . . [provided] protection against the possibility that [the] property [would] be vacated 
and abandoned sometime in the indefinite future. . . .”30 
 III.    Mandated Adherence to Applicable Restrictive Provisions  
 Section 365(b)(3)(C) of the Bankruptcy Code requires  a debtor to provide adequate 
assurance that the assumption or assignment of an unexpired lease within a shopping center is 
subject to provisions such as a radius, location, use, or exclusivity provision, and will not breach 
any such provision contained in any other lease, financing agreement, or master agreement in 
such shopping center.31This imposes restrictions on the types of lessees to whom a debtor may 
assign an unexpired lease.  
In In re Heilig-Meyers Co., the Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Virginia 
denied the proposed sale, assumption and assignment to Hanrick Fabric store because the debtor 
did not satisfy the requirements of section 365(b)(3)(C).32 The proposed assignee, Hanrick 
Fabric, was in the business of selling fabrics.33 However, there was another fabric store 
(“Fabric”) within the shopping center that had an exclusivity provision in its lease, which 
prohibited the assignment to a store that would be in direct competition with Fabric.34 Because 
Hanrick Fabric would be direct competition with Fabric, the proposed lease would have violated 
the exclusivity provision and therefore was denied.35  
In contrast, certain circumstances allow an assignment or assumption of an unexpired 
lease within a shopping center notwithstanding its prohibition by another stores lease or master 
agreement. This was the case in In re Toys “R” Us.36 There, the Bankruptcy Court for the 
 
30 Id. 
31 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(3)(C). 
32 In re Heilig-Meyers Co., 294 B.R. 660, 663 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2001). 
33 Id. at 662. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. at 663. 
36 In re Toys “R” Us, Inc., 587 B.R. 304 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2018). 
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Eastern District of Virginia held that the assumption and assignment of the unexpired subject 
lease did not violate section 365(b)(3)(C), although the lease was subsumed in the exclusive use 
provision of another store’s lease in the shopping center.37 The debtor, Toys “R” Us, proposed to 
assume and assign its unexpired lease to Burlington Coat Factory (“Burlington”), an off-price 
retail store.38 Another off-price retail store had an exclusivity provision in its lease prohibiting 
assignment to any other off-price retail stores within the shopping center.39 However, the court 
ruled that such an exclusivity provision is only applicable when the relevant party has sufficient 
legal capacity to require performance.40 The court-approved assumption and assignment to 
Burlington rendered the landlord without capacity to prevent the assignment.41 Therefore, the 
court upheld the assumption and assignment.42  
The language in section 365(b)(3)(C), which requires compliance with other lease 
provisions, conflicts with section 365(f)(1).43 Section 365(f)(1) provides that notwithstanding a 
provision in an executory contract or lease of the debtor, or in applicable law, that prohibits, 
restricts, or conditions the assignment of such contract or lease, the trustee may assign such 
contract or lease so long as adequate assurance is provided.44 In the past, courts have disagreed 
about which provision is paramount in regard to shopping center leases, but case law has 
attempted to reconcile these provisions.45  
 
37 Id. at 310–11. 
38 Id. at 307. 
39 Id. at 308. 
40 Id. at 310. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. at 311. 
43 See In re Joshua Slocum Ltd., 922 F.2d 1081, 1090 (3d Cir. 1990). 
44 11 U.S.C. §365(f)(1). 
45 See Binford, supra note, at 5. 
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Many courts have held that section 365(b)(3)(C) trumps 365(f)(1).46 For example, the 
Fourth Circuit adopted this view in Trak Auto Corp. v. West Town Center.47 The Fourth Circuit 
ruled that section 365(f)(1) doesn’t authorize a court to modify the original bargain between a 
landlord of a shopping center by invalidating a restrictive use provision.48 The debtor-tenant, 
Trak Auto Corporation, sought to assume and assign its shopping center lease to a non-auto part 
retailer, which was prohibited by a restrictive use provision in its lease.49 The Fourth Circuit 
denied the motion to assume and assign on the basis it would violate the restrictive use provision, 
emphasizing the saliency in adhering to the heightened requirements for shopping centers.50  
Several other courts also follow this policy of preserving the special interests of shopping 
center landlords.51 However, other courts adopt a different position. In In re Rickel Home 
Centers, Inc., the district court noted that section 365(b)(3)(C) and 365(f)(1) must be read 
together.52 In In re Rickel Home, the court considered whether a debtor operating a home 
improvement store in a shopping center could assume and assign a lease to Staples for the 
operation of an office supply store.53 The proposed assumption and assignment was prohibited 
by two restrictive use provisions, which mandated the premises to be maintained solely for the 
purposes of a home improvement store.54 The court ruled the restrictive use provisions 
unenforceable, stating that “courts and commentators alike have construed the terms to not only 
render unenforceable lease provisions which prohibit assignment outright, but also lease 
 
46 Id.  
47 Trak Auto Corp. v. West Town Center (In re Trak Auto Corp.), 367 F.3d 237 (4th Cir. 2004). 
48 Id. at 244. 
49 Id. at 239–40. 
50 Id. at 245. 
51 See, e.g., In re Sun TV Appliances, Inc., 234 B.R. 356 (Bankr. D. Del. 1999) (holding shopping center use 
provisions are accorded important significance by Congress in section 365(b)(3)). 
52 In re Rickel Home Centers, Inc., 240 B.R. 826, 832 (Bankr. D. Del. 1998). 
53 Id. at 829. 
54 Id. at 830. 
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provisions that are so restrictive that they constitute de facto anti-assignment provisions.”55  
Testimony from the debtor’s president revealed that no home improvement store was looking to 
assume the subject lease; the court used this as a basis to conclude the use provision would 
prohibit any assignment, acting as an anti-assignment clause.56 Thus, the court held the use 
provision null under section 365(f)(1).57 
IV.   Avoiding Disruption of Tenant Mix and Balance 
 The final provision of section 365(b)(3), paragraph (d), provides that an assignment must 
not disrupt the tenant mix or balance of the shopping center.58 A proposed assignment may be 
allowed under the aforementioned subsections of section 365(b)(3), but if a substantial disruption 
of tenant mix or balance is probable then a court will be unwilling to grant the proposed 
assignment. “[T]he tenant mix in a shopping center may be as important to the lessor as the 
actual promised rental payments, because certain mixes will attract higher patronage of the stores 
in the center.”59  
A majority of courts use a flexible approach in the enforcement of tenant mix clauses and 
typically approve assignment if the disruption is insignificant.60 In In re Ames Dept. Stores, Inc., 
the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York approved the assignment of a 
department store lease to a lessee that intended to use the premises to operate a furniture store 
and sublet a portion of the property.61 The debtor, Zayre Illinois Corporation (“Zayre”), sought to 
assign their unexpired lease of non-residential property in The Thatcher Woods Shopping Center 
 
55 Id. at 832. 
56 Id. at 831–32. 
57 Id. at 832. 
58 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(3)(D). 
59 In re Joshua Slocum Ltd., 922 F.2d at 1089. 
60 See Edward M. Flint, Lease Assignments and Anti-Assignment Clauses: Lessors, Lessees and Creditors—Oh My!, 
9 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 321, 332 (2000). 
61In re Ames Dept. Stores, Inc., 127 B.R. at 753–54. 
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(the “Lease”) to Schottenstein Stores Corporation (“Schottenstein”).62 The Lease did not restrict 
use of the premises in any way, nor did any of the other existing leases in the shopping center.63 
The court relying on its own precedent reiterated that “[t]he statute itself thus directs tenant mix 
inquiry to contractual provisions rather than general notions of tenant mix.”64 Thus, because the 
lease permitted the premises to be used for any purpose and there was nothing in the record that 
indicated the landlord bargained for the right to preserve tenant mix, the assumption and 
assignment was allowed.65 The “construction of section 365(b)(3)(D) is consistent with the 
notion that a court should avoid infringement of property rights.”66 Without sufficient evidence 
to show a contractual provision will be violated, a court will likely be reluctant to prohibit an 
assumption or assigned pursuant to section 365(b)(3)(D).67  
CONCLUSION 
A debtor-tenant located in a shopping center that files for bankruptcy may assume and 
assign their unexpired lease but must satisfy the requirements of section 365(b)(3).68 The 
Bankruptcy Code incorporated adequate assurance of future performance to ensure the non-
debtor party of the agreement receives the benefit of its bargain.69 “Shopping center landlords are 
given greater protection through the more specific provisions of section 365(b)(3), but these 
provisions are additional means to the same end–the preservation of that bargain.”70 If a debtor 
satisfies the heightened requirements of section 365(b)(3), courts are likely to approve the 
 
62 Id. at 745. 
63 Id. at 746. 
64 Id. at 752. 
65 Id. at 753–54. 
66 In re Ames Dept. Stores, Inc., 127 B.R. at 166. 
67 Id.  
68 See 11 U.S.C. §365(b)(3). 
69 See id. 
70 Id. 
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assumption and assumption based on the clear congressional policy favoring assumption and 
assignment.71  
Under section 365(b)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code, adequate assurance of future 
performance requires an examination based on the facts at hand and the lease at issue.72 Courts 
may, however, perceive similar facts differently.73  
 
 
 
71 See In re Martin Paint Stores, 199 B.R. 258, 263 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
72 See In re Sapolin Paints, Inc., 5 B.R. at 420. 
73 See Binford, supra note, at 5 (“This discussion of adequate assurance of future performance case law makes it 
clear that determining whether the standards set out in section 365 have been met requires a fact-intensive inquiry. 
No two cases are ever exactly alike, and different courts may view similar facts differently.”). 
